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ABSTRACT 
The CRISPR/Cas9 genome engineering platform is the first 
method of gene editing that could potentially be used to treat 
genetic disorders in human embryos. No past therapies, genetic 
or otherwise, have been intended or used to treat disorders in 
existent embryos. Past procedures performed on embryos have 
exclusively involved creation and implantation (e.g., in-vitro 
fertilization) or screening and selection of already-healthy 
embryos (e.g., preimplantation genetic diagnosis). A 
CRISPR/Cas9 treatment would evade medical malpractice law 
due to the early stage of the intervention and the fact that it is not 
a treatment for the mother. In most jurisdictions, medical 
professionals owe no duty to pre-viable fetuses or embryos as 
such, but will be held liable for negligent treatment of the mother 
if the treatment causes injury to a born-alive child.  This issue 
brief discusses the science of CRISPR/Cas9, the background legal 
status of human embryos, and the case for considering genetically 
engineered embryos as patients for purposes of medical 
malpractice law. 
INTRODUCTION 
 Fernando and Pilar Ruiz hail from the shores of Lake Maracaibo 
in Venezuela, where almost 1% of the population is affected by 
Huntington’s disease,1 a rare and incurable genetic disorder.2 While Pilar 
is healthy, Fernando is not so fortunate. Both of his parents died from 
Huntington’s, and Fernando carries two copies of the deadly Huntington’s 
gene. Since inheriting only one copy is sufficient to pass on the disease,3 
                                                     
† Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2018; Imperial College London, 
M.Sc. Human Molecular Genetics, 2014; University of Chicago, B.A. Religious 
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1 How Common Is Huntington’s Disease (HD)?, HUNTINGTON’S NEW S. WALES, 
http://www.huntingtonsnsw.org.au/information/hd-facts/how-common (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2017). 
2 See Sara Imarisio et al., Huntington’s Disease: From Pathology and Genetics to 
Potential Therapies, 412 BIOCHEMICAL J. 191, 191, 200 (2008) (discussing basic 
features of the disease and treatment options). 
3 Id. 
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Fernando cannot have healthy children, and the couple is distraught over 
the prospect that Fernando will die childless. 
 No current technological measures can solve the Ruizes’ 
predicament, but the promise of surmounting this sort of obstacle to 
bearing healthy children is closer to reality than ever before in the form of 
a new gene editing technology called CRISPR/Cas9.4 The CRISPR/Cas9 
technology promises the ability to specifically target and shut down or 
replace genes in human embryos.5 Particular sections of DNA with 
disease-causing genes can be replaced with healthy copies of the genes, 
curing some genetic diseases.6 Furthermore, unlike contemporary gene 
therapies performed on adults, CRISPR/Cas9 would alter the germline of 
its embryonic targets, not just the somatic or non-reproductive-cell DNA: 
the eventual children of individuals treated as embryos would inherit the 
healthy, altered gene.7 Contemporary gene therapies, which edit the 
genome to attenuate or cure genetic disease, alter only somatic cell DNA, 
so the children of gene therapy recipients could still express or carry the 
disease. But germline editing, if broadly accessible, could eliminate entire 
genetic diseases. The technology will not be ready for clinical use in 
human embryos before ethical8 and methodological9 issues are resolved, 
but its significant curative potential is already being recognized 
throughout the scientific community.10 
 While the science of CRISPR/Cas9 has been blazing a new trail 
in therapeutic potential, the development of the law governing the 
                                                     
4 See Tetsuya Ishii, Germ Line Genome Editing in Clinics: The Approaches, 
Objectives and Global Society, 16 BRIEFINGS IN FUNCTIONAL GENOMICS 46, 48 
(2017) (“[F]urther research will likely make germ line genome editing clinically 
feasible in the near future.”). 
5 See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., INTERNATIONAL SUMMIT ON 
HUMAN GENE EDITING: A GLOBAL DISCUSSION 1–2 (2015) (describing the 
promise of CRISPR/Cas9 and the potential applications of human germline 
editing). 
6 See id. at 2 (discussing cystic fibrosis, sickle cell anemia, and Huntington’s 
disease). 
7 Id. 
8 Ethical objections involve, for example, concern for the moral status of the 
embryo, rising inequality, and potential eugenic applications. Id. at 4. 
9 See Rongxue Peng, Guigao Lin & Jinming Li, Potential Pitfalls of 
CRISPR/Cas9-Mediated Genome Editing, 283 FEBS J. 1218, 1223, 1226–27 
(2016) (discussing off-target effects, low homology-directed repair rates, and 
agent delivery difficulties). 
10 See generally Katrine S. Bosley et al., CRISPR Germline Engineering—The 
Community Speaks, 33 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 478 (2015) (compiling expert 
opinions on the potential and ethics of germline editing). 
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treatment of preimplantation human embryos has lagged behind.11 
Assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) are regulated much more 
lightly—and inconsistently from state to state—than the prevalence of 
their use and the depth of the interests at stake demand.12 Neither Congress 
nor most state legislatures are particularly willing to regulate ARTs, as the 
question of the legal status of the embryo is highly politically polarizing.13 
 One possible method of regulation in the face of legislative 
inaction is to proceed by the common law. For example, some state courts 
have applied property law or contract law to novel disputes involving 
unimplanted embryos created by ART.14 Such extensions of common law 
doctrines and statutory law to cover new situations are well-meaning 
efforts to provide a remedy for unaddressed but wrongful acts. 
 However, as treatments like CRISPR/Cas9 become available, the 
inadequacy of these patchwork efforts as an overall regulatory regime for 
the ART industry15 will become more apparent. CRISPR/Cas9 promises 
the first therapy intended to cure disease in human embryos, aimed at 
allowing those embryos to develop into disease-free members of society. 
This course of therapy, unlike the ARTs that have come before it, treats 
the embryos (not just the parents) as patients. The proper basic legal 
principle to govern embryonic treatment with CRISPR/Cas9 ought to be 
the same that governs other doctor-patient relationships. 
I. SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND 
A. A Quick Introduction to ART and Human Genetics 
 Every human begins his or her life as a single cell, a union of 
sperm and egg called a zygote.16 After the egg is fertilized, the new zygote 
divides, each of the two new cells divides, and so on; at this point, the 
entity is called a cleavage-stage embryo.17 After a few days, the embryo 
implants in the uterine wall, as its cells continue to divide and specialize 
                                                     
11 Catherine A. Clements, What About the Children? A Call for Regulation of 
Assisted Reproductive Technology, 84 IND. L.J. 331, 331 (2009). 
12 Jennifer L. Rosato, The Children of ART (Assisted Reproductive Technology): 
Should the Law Protect Them from Harm?, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 57, 64–65 (2004). 
13 Id. at 73–75. 
14 Gregory A. Triber, Growing Pains: Disputes Surrounding Human Reproductive 
Interests Stretch the Boundaries of Traditional Legal Concepts, 23 SETON HALL 
LEGIS. J. 103, 104 (1998). 
15 Id. 
16 T.W. SADLER, LANGMAN’S MEDICAL EMBRYOLOGY 10 (12th ed. 2012). 
17 Fernando J. Prados, Sophie Debrock, Josephine G. Lemmen & Inge Agerholm, 
The Cleavage Stage Embryo, 27 HUM. REPROD. (SUPPLEMENT 1) i50, i50 (2012). 
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into various tissues.18 At the end of its eighth week of life, the embryo 
becomes classified as a fetus and remains so until birth.19  
 ARTs are used to create zygotes outside the mother’s uterus and 
implant them within it, often because conventional reproduction is 
unavailing.20 The most common procedure is in vitro fertilization (IVF): a 
fertility doctor extracts egg cells from the patient or a donor, fertilizes them 
in the lab with sperm cells from the sperm donor, allows the embryos to 
grow, and deposits them in the patient’s uterus in the hope that at least one 
will successfully implant and develop into a healthy baby.21 Techniques 
used to supplement traditional IVF include intracytoplasmic sperm 
injection (ICSI),22 a way to compensate for low male fertility by injecting 
the sperm directly into the egg, and preimplantation genetic diagnosis 
(PGD), a technique for diagnosing genetic disease in embryos so that only 
healthy embryos can be implanted.23 
 The adult human body is composed of trillions of small cells, and 
(with a few exceptions) every cell contains all the genetic information that 
the zygote contained.24 This information is encoded in deoxyribonucleic 
acid, or DNA, a double-stranded molecule arranged in a double helix 
conformation.25 Each strand consists of a series of sugar molecular units 
stuck to one another in a chain, with one of four nucleotide bases—
adenine, thymine, cytosine, or guanine, commonly abbreviated A, T, C, 
and G—attached to each sugar unit, sticking out toward the other strand, 
and meeting another base in the middle.26 The bases pair up according to 
a specific pattern—A bonds only with T, and C with G—due to their 
respective chemical bonding properties.27 The strands are considered 
                                                     
18 SADLER, supra note 16, at 38–39. 
19 Id. at 96. 
20 Noah Baron & Jennifer Bazzell, Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 15 GEO. 
J. GENDER & L. 57, 57–58 (2014). 
21 Id. at 58–59. 
22 Id. at 59. 
23 Id. at 91–92. 
24 A Brief Guide to Genomics, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST. (Aug. 27, 2015), 
https://www.genome.gov/18016863/a-brief-guide-to-genomics; Rose Eveleth, 
There Are 37.2 Trillion Cells in Your Body, SMITHSONIAN: SMARTNEWS, 
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/there-are-372-trillion-cells-in-
your-body-4941473 (last updated Oct. 24, 2013). 
25 ROBERT SCHLEIF, GENETICS AND MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 22–23 (2d ed. 1993). 
26 Id. at 22. 
27 Id. at 22–23. 
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complementary: each strand acts as a template to make a copy of the other, 
allowing each cell to replicate itself accurately.28 
 A typical human cell’s DNA is contained in 46 chromosomes, 
arranged in 23 homologous pairs; one chromosome in each pair is 
inherited from each parent.29 Each chromosome contains stretches of 
DNA, called genes, which instruct other cellular mechanisms to produce 
certain proteins, which do the work of the cell.30 Changing the sequence 
of the gene—for instance, replacing one base with another, or deleting or 
inserting bases—will often change the function of the protein.31 
 DNA instructions are read by a protein called RNA polymerase, 
which creates a single-stranded transcript of the gene out of ribonucleic 
acid, or RNA.32 RNA, like DNA, consists of a sugar backbone and a 
sequence of bases; an RNA transcript of a DNA sequence consists of a 
complementary sequence, which binds strongly to the template DNA 
sequence.33 This transcript then travels to the ribosome, the cell’s protein 
factory, which creates the encoded protein.34   
 When DNA-copying mechanisms miscopy a gene, by changing, 
adding, or deleting bases, the changes in the encoded protein can cause it 
to function incorrectly.35 Any individual mutation occurring in a single 
adult somatic cell will often be harmless; in fact, adult cells accumulate a 
large number of mutations steadily over time.36 But if the mutation is 
present in a gamete—a sperm or egg cell—every cell of the person who 
develops from the mutated cell will have this germline genetic mutation, 
which could cause a genetic disease.37 Germline genome editing could 
solve this problem entirely by replacing a diseased gene with a healthy 
copy in an embryo.38 
                                                     
28 Id. at 2. 
29 SADLER, supra note 16, at 11. 
30 Id. at 3. 
31 SCHLEIF, supra note 25, at 228–29. 
32 Id. at 85–86. 
33 Id. at 22, 85. 
34 Id. at 86. 
35 Id. at 228–29. 
36 Francis Blokzijl et al., Tissue-Specific Mutation Accumulation in Human Adult 
Stem Cells during Life, 538 NATURE 260, 260 (2016); see also ANTHONY 
GRIFFITHS ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO GENETIC ANALYSIS 456 (8th ed. 2005) 
(“Many point mutations within noncoding sequences elicit little or no phenotypic 
change . . . .”). 
37 See GRIFFITHS ET AL., supra note 36, at 376–77 (describing the difference 
between somatic and germline gene therapy). 
38 Id. 
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B. How CRISPR/Cas9 Works 
 CRISPR/Cas9 is a molecular complex consisting of the Cas9 
protein and a short RNA molecule.39 The RNA molecule is 
complementary to a target DNA sequence, which it seeks out and binds to 
when inserted into a cell.40 Once the RNA has bound to the target DNA, 
the attached Cas9 protein cuts both strands of the DNA molecule.41 The 
cell then uses one of two methods to repair the cut.42  One method, non-
homologous end joining, often inserts or deletes genetic material in the 
process of repair and is likely to stop the gene from functioning.43 
CRISPR/Cas9 can thus be used to “knock out” problem genes. Another 
method, homology-directed repair, involves the cell inserting some free-
floating genetic material into the break.44 Introducing CRISPR/Cas9 along 
with a DNA molecule carrying a gene of interest can thus insert the new 
gene at the target site.45 
 The CRISPR/Cas9 gene editing technology was developed from 
a bacterial adaptive immune system, which bacteria use to fight off viral 
infection.46 CRISPRs (clustered, regularly interspaced short palindromic 
repeats) are short stretches of bacterial DNA, interspaced along the single 
bacterial chromosome by virus-derived, spacer-DNA sequences.47 Several 
cas (CRISPR-associated) genes, located close to the CRISPR sequences, 
play different roles in operating or managing the CRISPR adaptive 
                                                     
39 See Kristin Beale, The CRISPR Patent Battle: Who Will Be “Cut” Out of Patent 
Rights to One of the Greatest Scientific Discoveries of Our Generation?, B.C. 
INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F., Feb. 2016, at 3. 
40 Id. at 2–3. 
41 Id. at 3. 
42 GRIFFITHS ET AL., supra note 36, at 472. 
43 Id.  
44 See id. at 473 (describing homology-directed repair as it typically occurs in 
nature, where the sister chromatid provides the repair template). 
45 Beale, supra note 39, at 3. 
46 Luciano A. Marraffini & Erik J. Sontheimer, CRISPR Interference: RNA-
Directed Adaptive Immunity in Bacteria and Archaea, 11 NATURE REVS. 
GENETICS 181, 181 (2010); see also Richard Warringon, Wade Watson, Harold 
L. Kim & Francesca Romana Antonetti, An Introduction to Immunology and 
Immunopathology, 7 ALLERGY, ASTHMA & CLINICAL IMMUNOLOGY 
(SUPPLEMENT 1) 1, 1 (2011) (stating that adaptive immunity is targeted at specific 
invading pathogens, as opposed to innate immunity, which excludes foreign 
material in general). 
47 Marraffini & Sontheimer, supra note 46, at 181–82. 
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immune system.48 Some of these genes function to append short sections 
of foreign DNA, derived from infecting viruses or plasmids,49 to the 
CRISPR site as spacers.50 Another of these genes codes for the Cas9 
protein, a programmable nuclease51 that forms a complex with crRNA 
(CRISPR RNA, transcribed from spacer DNA) to identify and cut foreign 
DNA at the sequence complementary to the complexed RNA.52 When a 
virus infects a Cas9-equipped bacterium,53 the bacterium first incorporates 
a segment of viral DNA into its CRISPR site as a spacer, rather than at a 
more dangerous site for the bacterium.54 It then creates a crRNA transcript 
from the newly incorporated spacer DNA, which forms a complex with 
the Cas9 protein to identify and cut the DNA of the invading viruses in 
order to fight off the infection.55   
 While the natural function of Cas9 is chiefly immunity, its 
laboratory applications are numerous and multiplying.56 Since Cas9 can 
easily be programmed to target any short DNA sequence and introduce a 
break in the DNA strand,57 it has been used to modify the function of 
numerous genes in many different species and cell types, including various 
types of human cells.58 Even more promisingly, supplementing the process 
by introducing exogenous donor DNA, which contains a sequence to be 
inserted, bookended with sequences homologous to those on both sides of 
                                                     
48 Devashish Rath, Lina Amlinger, Archana Rath & Magnus Lundgren, The 
CRISPR-Cas Immune System: Biology, Mechanisms and Applications, 117 
BIOCHIMIE 119, 119 (2015). 
49 Plasmids are free-floating molecules of DNA that bacteria can absorb and 
incorporate into their own genomes. 
50 Rath et al., supra note 48, at 119–20. 
51 A nuclease is a type of protein that cuts nucleic acids such as DNA. 
52 Rath et al., supra note 48, at 121. 
53 Viruses are made of protein and genetic material. They infect bacteria by 
injecting their genetic material into the bacterium. This material gets incorporated 
into the bacterial genome, which then instructs the cell to make more copies of 
the virus. These new viruses can leave the cell and infect other bacteria. Craig 
Pringle, Overview of Viral Infections, MERCK MANUALS, http://www.merck 
manuals.com/home/infections/viral-infections/overview-of-viral-infections (last 
visited Apr. 23, 2017). 
54 Rath et al., supra note 48, at 119. 
55 Id. at 120. 
56 Id. at 125–26. 
57 See Alex Reis, Breton Hornblower, Brett Robb & George Tzertzinis, 
CRISPR/Cas9 and Targeted Genome Editing: A New Era in Molecular Biology, 
2014 NEB EXPRESSIONS, no. 1, at 3, 4. Wild type Cas9 creates double strand 
breaks in target DNA. Modified forms of Cas9 can create single strand breaks or 
bind to DNA without creating a break. Id. 
58 Rath et al., supra note 48, at 126. 
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the Cas9-induced break, results in homology-directed repair inserting the 
donor sequence at the site of the break.59 The core of Cas9’s therapeutic 
promise is this ability to make breaks, at essentially any site in the genome, 
that donor DNA can fill. 
C. CRISPR/Cas9 Potentially Allows Editing Embryos in 
Clinical Medicine, but Hurdles Remain 
 The CRISPR/Cas9 system promises to be the first gene-editing 
platform with enough specificity, efficiency, and development potential to 
become a clinical gene therapy for human embryos.60 Prior to the 
development of CRISPR/Cas9, the most effective gene-editing 
technologies—zinc-finger nucleases (ZFNs) and transcription-activator 
like effector nucleases (TALENs)—required redesign of the DNA-protein 
interface for every new target, making them expensive to develop for 
specific gene sequences.61 CRISPR/Cas9 is different: since the Cas9 
protein remains constant between uses, and only the guide RNA needs to 
be changed to target a new gene, the system is much cheaper to use and 
experiment with than the older alternatives.62 This reduction in price has 
democratized gene-editing technology and prompted a flurry of research 
activity, leading to numerous improvements and additional uses for 
CRISPR/Cas9.63 
 The most controversial use to which CRISPR/Cas9 has been put 
to date occurred in 2015 in China, where researchers tried to use the 
                                                     
59 See id. A sequence is homologous to another if the two match or nearly match. 
Essentially, this feature allows any “insertion, deletion, or change in [DNA] 
sequence” nearly anywhere in the genome. Id. 
60 See id. (claiming that CRISPR/Cas9 “could be used to alter DNA in human 
embryos to prevent non-complex hereditary diseases”); see also Jennifer A. 
Doudna & Emmanuelle Charpentier, The New Frontier of Genome Engineering 
with CRISPR-Cas9, 346 SCIENCE 1258096-1, 1258096-4 (2014) (“CRISPR-Cas9 
represents an efficient tool to edit the genomes of human cells.” (citations 
omitted)); Anna Zaret, Note, Editing Embryos: Considering Restrictions on 
Genetically Engineering Humans, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1805, 1808 (2016) (“With 
[CRISPR/Cas9] it is increasingly likely that embryos will one day be edited and 
used to create genetically modified humans.”).  
61 Doudna & Charpentier, supra note 60, at 1258096-3. 
62 Ishii, supra note 4, at 3. 
63 See Doudna & Charpentier, supra note 60, at 1258096-3. Clinical trials for 
therapies created with the in vitro use of CRISPR/Cas9 are currently underway, 
and more are planned. Sara Reardon, First CRISPR Clinical Trial Gets Green 
Light from US Panel, NATURE (June 22, 2016), http://www.nature.com/news/ 
first-crispr-clinical-trial-gets-green-light-from-us-panel-1.20137. 
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platform to edit the genomes of human zygotes.64 Though the zygotes used 
in the study were terminally defective and would not have developed 
beyond the blastocyst stage in any case,65 the study prompted an outcry 
from the worldwide scientific community. Many scientists called for a 
global moratorium on clinical editing of human embryos until the 
international community settled on regulatory guidelines.66 
 Despite the limited efficacy of the first attempt to edit human 
embryos, the scientific community remains largely convinced that the 
CRISPR/Cas9 system will develop into a clinically useful tool for 
germline editing.67 The rate at which gene editing fails or goes awry, 
introducing unforeseen and harmful changes in the genome of the targeted 
cell, is still far too high to introduce CRISPR/Cas9 into clinical use in 
embryos just yet.68 But the speed of technological improvement, which 
comes from the sheer number of scientists working with and tweaking the 
cheap and easy-to-use system, promises to improve this rate over time.69 
Whether the regulatory environment will be ready for clinical embryo 
editing, or whether it will repeat the missteps of prior attempts to regulate 
ARTs, remains to be seen. 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Sources and Circumstances of Liability for Injuries to a 
Preborn Child or Embryo 
 Whatever form of regulation eventually governs fertility clinics’ 
use of gene editing technology ought to compensate children who were 
injured as embryos through negligently performed gene editing. In all 
                                                     
64 David Cyranoski & Sara Reardon, Chinese Scientists Genetically Modify 
Human Embryos, NATURE (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.nature.com/news/ 
chinese-scientists-genetically-modify-human-embryos-1.17378. 
65 Puping Liang et al., CRISPR/Cas9-Mediated Gene Editing in Human 
Tripronuclear Zygotes, 6 PROTEIN & CELL 363, 363 (2015). 
66 Edward Lanphier et al., Don’t Edit the Human Germ Line, 519 NATURE 410, 
411 (2015), http://www.nature.com/news/don-t-edit-the-human-germ-line-1.171 
11. 
67 See Bosley et al., supra note 10, at 479; COMM. ON HUMAN GENE EDITING, 
NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS. & NAT’L ACAD. OF MED., HUMAN GENOME EDITING: 
SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND GOVERNANCE (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 89), 
https://www.nap.edu/catalog/24623/human-genome-editing-science-ethics-and-
governance (last visited Apr. 10, 2017) (“[T]he efficiency and accuracy of 
targeting can be extremely high, and there are sound reasons for believing that 
off-target effects can be greatly reduced . . . .”). 
68 Cyranoski & Reardon, supra note 64. 
69 See Doudna & Charpentier, supra note 60, at 1258096-4 (citing several variants 
of the technology developed for various applications). 
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American jurisdictions, a child who is injured prenatally and later born 
alive can recover tort damages.70 Although some older case law seemed to 
restrict recovery to cases in which the child was injured after attaining 
viability, the majority of jurisdictions now allow recovery for injuries 
sustained at any point between conception and birth.71 Even more, some 
jurisdictions recognize preconception torts, in which a child can recover 
even when she had not yet been conceived at the time the tortious breach 
of duty occurred.72   
 Courts that have recognized preconception torts have done so by 
reading the duty requirement broadly, as a public policy determination that 
liability is appropriate in certain circumstances. One court, recognizing a 
preconception cause of action for a child injured because of negligent 
surgery performed on the mother’s uterus before the child’s conception, 
employed the following analogy:73 
Assume a balcony is negligently constructed. Two years later, a 
mother and her one-year-old child step onto the balcony and it gives 
way, causing serious injury to both the mother and the child. It would 
be ludicrous to suggest that only the mother would have a cause of 
action against the builder but, because the infant was not conceived 
at the time of the negligent conduct, no duty of care existed toward 
the child.74 
In this case, the child was not only a member of the class of people 
foreseeably affected by the surgeon’s negligence, but also a third-party 
beneficiary of the doctor-patient relationship.75 Finding a duty thus 
comported with already-accepted principles of tort law.  
 Courts that have refused to recognize preconception torts have 
tended to read the duty requirement as something owed to a particular 
                                                     
70 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869 (AM. LAW INST. 1979); Matthew 
Browne, Preconception Tort Law in an Era of Assisted Reproduction: Applying a 
Nexus Test for Duty, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2555, 2560 (2001). 
71 Browne, supra note 70, at 2560–61. But see Andrews v. Keltz, 838 N.Y.S.2d 
363, 370 (Sup. Ct. 2007) (disallowing recovery for injuries sustained after 
conception but prior to implantation, since no duty exists to a pre-implantation 
embryo). 
72 See, e.g., Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (Ill. 1977); 
Martin v. St. John Hosp. & Med. Ctr. Corp., 517 N.W.2d 787, 789 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1994). 
73 Martin, 517 N.W.2d at 789. 
74 Id. (quoting Lough v. Rolla Women’s Clinic, Inc., 866 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Mo. 
1993)).  
75 Id. 
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person in existence at the time of the breaching act.76 Policy rationales for 
this reading have included a desire not to extend liability to remote 
injuries, even foreseeable ones. In the medical context, imposing liability 
could result in conflicts of interest between patients and their potential 
future children, leading to the practice of “defensive medicine,” in which 
doctors act to minimize their chance of being sued rather than in their 
patient’s best interests.77 
 The question of whether embryos or fetuses count as persons, to 
whom duties in general are owed, is a thorny one. Only one state, 
Louisiana, recognizes human embryos created through in vitro 
fertilization (IVF) as juridical persons,78 but many other states recognize 
duties to in utero embryos and fetuses regardless of live birth. For instance, 
the wrongful death laws of the majority of the states recognize the claims 
of viable fetuses who die before birth, and a few states recognize such 
claims for any fetus or implanted embryo, regardless of viability.79 No 
state recognizes a wrongful death claim for an embryo stored outside the 
body of the mother;80 when an Illinois trial court once interpreted the 
state’s wrongful death statute to include such embryos, the appellate court 
reversed, reading the legislative history of the statute as restricting its 
scope to embryos and fetuses in utero.81   
B.  When a Medical Practitioner’s Duty of Care to an Embryo 
or Fetus Arises 
 In the medical malpractice context, a duty arises from the 
existence of a physician-patient relationship.82 In the fertility clinic 
                                                     
76 Browne, supra note 70, at 2596–97.  
77 See Albala v. City of New York, 429 N.E.2d 786, 788 (N.Y. 1981) (refusing to 
find a duty to the later-conceived child of a woman on whom an abortion was 
negligently performed, resulting in injury to the later child). 
78 LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:123 (2015).  
79 See generally Jill D. Washburn Helbling, To Recover or Not To Recover: A 
State by State Survey of Fetal Wrongful Death Law, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 363 (1996) 
(detailing which states recognize a cause of action for fetal wrongful death).  
80 See Maria Pellegrino, Murder in A Petri Dish? The Wrath of Illinois’ Miller v. 
American Infertility Group: A Push for Legislative Action, 13 BUFF. WOMEN’S 
L.J. 137, 137 (2005) (claiming that a wrongful death cause of action for a 
preimplantation embryo is “without precedent in any jurisdiction”).  
81 Miller v. Am. Infertility Grp. of Ill., S.C., 897 N.E.2d 837, 839, 845 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2008). The appellate decision was primarily premised on principles of 
statutory interpretation (for example, construing the wrongful death statute 
narrowly due to its derogation of the common law) rather than the policy 
implications of extending wrongful death liability to preimplantation embryos. Id. 
82 Johnson v. Thompson, 650 S.E.2d 322, 323 n.4 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). 
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context, before an embryo is implanted, only the mother is generally 
considered a patient for purposes of this relationship. After implantation, 
physicians providing prenatal care have a duty to both the mother and the 
fetus, due to the fetus’s presence in utero.83 
 This limitation on duty would seem to foreclose the possibility of 
preconception medical provider torts, since every physician-patient 
relationship requires a patient to exist. As a general rule, if a duty does not 
exist to a person (or class of persons, of whom the injured party is a 
member) at the time a wrongful act or omission occurred, the person 
cannot recover for injuries that the wrong caused.84 Despite this traditional 
limitation, twelve jurisdictions, out of sixteen that have considered the 
issue, have either found liability for preconception torts or indicated that 
such liability might be appropriate in some circumstances.85 These courts 
have generally found such liability because it was reasonably foreseeable, 
in the cases considered, that the as-yet-unconceived children would be 
harmed by the defendants’ breach of a medical duty to another person, the 
mother.86  Some courts have justified this expansion of duty, specifically 
in the medical context, by analogizing it to third-party beneficiary liability 
in contract.87 
 While the maternal nexus of duty serves well to compensate the 
victims of the forms of preconception torts that have been recognized, 
courts have been reticent to completely unmoor the duty analysis from any 
specific person in existence at the time of the breaching act.88 The courts’ 
unwillingness to recognize either a direct preimplantation duty to human 
embryos or a theory of third-party harm that does not rely on a breach of 
                                                     
83 See id. at 324 (holding that a prenatal care provider had a duty to a fetus “while 
he was in utero”); Brown v. Shwarts, 968 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Tex. 1998) (“[A] fetus 
can be a patient.”). In some jurisdictions, despite the existence of this medical 
provider duty, breaches are only actionable if the child is born alive. See HCA, 
Inc. v. Miller, 36 S.W.3d 187, 195 n.21 (Tex. App. 2000), aff'd, 118 S.W.3d 758 
(Tex. 2003).  
84 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99–100 (N.Y. 1928). 
85 Julie A. Greenberg, Reconceptualizing Preconception Torts, 64 TENN. L. REV. 
315, 320 (1997). 
86 See, e.g., Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (Ill. 1977). 
Renslow involved a case of Rh sensitization, a medical phenomenon causing no 
injury to the mother but foreseeably harming her future children, caused by 
medical negligence. Id. at 1251. 
87 See, e.g., Walker v. Rinck, 604 N.E.2d 591, 594–95 (Ind. 1992). 
88 Renslow, 367 N.E.2d at 1255; see also Hegyes v. Unjian Enters., Inc., 286 Cal. 
Rptr. 85, 89 (Ct. App. 1991), reh’g denied and opinion modified (Oct. 23, 1991) 
(suggesting that a duty to not-yet-conceived children can arise out of a special 
relationship with the mother).  
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duty to the mother leaves a gap in the law. A breach of duty to the mother 
before the child is created, causing injury to the child, is compensable, as 
is a breach of duty to the pregnant mother causing similar injuries to the 
child. But technologies like CRISPR/Cas9, the use of which would 
constitute a treatment for the embryonic child and not the mother, fit 
within neither of these recognized duties. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Distinction Between CRISPR/Cas9 and Contemporary ARTs 
Regarding Tort Liability 
 Imposing tort liability to regulate ART use has met with several 
obstacles. The problem to be addressed is that ARTs are risky for the 
children created and often cause injury to them.89 But the unique point in 
the child’s life at which the ART intervention occurs makes applying 
traditional tort concepts difficult. 
 The basic objections to tort liability in the ART context take three 
main forms. First is the problem of non-identity: since medical duties are 
generally owed to persons in existence at the time a breach occurred, no 
liability to a person would attach to an act, such as IVF, that creates that 
person.90 Second, regardless of what the child’s injury is, ART 
practitioners are not net-liable for it because their negligent act conferred 
a net benefit, life itself, on the child.91 Third, creating a duty to persons not 
yet in existence is properly a decision for a democratically elected 
legislature, rather than a court.92 
 A clinical CRISPR/Cas9 gene editing treatment could avoid these 
limits on liability, due to its differences from currently available ARTs. 
An example course of treatment for illustrating these differences could 
comprise IVF, introduction of the targeted Cas9 nuclease and donor DNA 
                                                     
89 Rosato, supra note 12, at 76. Fertility treatments tend to create multiple births 
and are responsible for nearly all the especially dangerous, highly multiple 
pregnancies that occur (for example, the “Octomom.”). Alison Stateman, The 
Fertility Doctor Behind the “Octomom,” TIME (Mar. 7, 2009), http://content. 
time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1883663,00.html. 
90 Browne, supra note 70, at 2555. 
91 Id. at 2555–56. For instance, if a fertility doctor negligently chooses to perform 
an intracytoplasmic sperm injection, a method of directly injecting the sperm into 
the egg, rather than conventional IVF, the injured child would have no cause of 
action, since choosing IVF would have resulted in a different sperm fertilizing the 
egg and a different person in the plaintiff’s shoes. See id. at 2587 (“The benefit 
rule poses an insurmountable challenge to plaintiffs who have the negligent act of 
the defendant to thank for their very existence.”). 
92 Id. at 2556. 
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sequence to the in vitro zygote, and implantation of the lab-grown, treated 
embryo.  
 Regarding the limitations on duty: once the IVF occurs, a unique 
human organism is created, to which a duty could conceivably attach (for 
purposes of subsequent medical treatments, like CRISPR/Cas9) without 
expanding the universe of duty too broadly, e.g., to nonexistent or merely 
imaginable persons. In fact, such an expansion of duty would be miniscule. 
Since all jurisdictions recognize a duty to embryos and fetuses in utero, 
recognizing the same duty ex utero would not require any great leaps of 
judicial moral philosophy or special legislative policy determinations.93 
The only salient difference between embryos currently owed duties and 
embryos owed this proposed new duty would be the embryo’s location—
inside or outside of the uterus. The limitations on duty that currently apply 
to embryos and fetuses, perhaps requiring attainment of viability or live 
birth before liability attaches, would apply to this proposed duty as well. 
 Regarding the offsetting-benefit limitation on injury: treatment 
with Cas9 is a medical intervention designed to improve the health of an 
already-existing embryo, more akin to surgery performed on a fetus in 
utero than IVF. Since the hypothetical negligently performed act—gene 
editing with CRISPR/Cas9—would not be the act that created the embryo, 
the resulting harm is measured not against nonexistence, but against the 
outcome in which a non-negligently performed gene edit would have 
resulted in the child being healthy. 
 Recognizing a duty that flows directly to the embryo, not merely 
by way of the mother, is necessary to make negligent gene editing 
compensable as a tort against the child. Since CRISPR/Cas9 would be a 
treatment for the embryo rather than the mother and would involve no 
medical intervention implicating the mother’s health,94 the physician 
would be under no duty to perform the procedure in accordance with a 
standard of care if his only duty were to the mother. The theories of duty 
that have underlain successful claims of post-implantation or pre-
conception torts are not applicable here, since both of those theories 
                                                     
93 Although the duty proposed here would run directly to the embryo, in a break 
with the derivative-duty regime of the status quo, such a change would not create 
liability in many additional cases. Due to the ethical questions surrounding 
germline gene editing, these cases are likely to be rare for quite some time. 
94 The mother could be harmed by her physician’s implanting a negligently edited 
embryo, which would be a breach of duty. But in that circumstance, the relevant 
act that the physician could be duty-bound to perform non-negligently would be 
the implantation, not the CRISPR/Cas9 treatment. Because implantation is a 
necessary step in embryonic development, the offsetting-benefit limitation on 
liability could preclude recovery for the child if the duty to the child is derivative 
of that to the mother. 
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require a duty nexus running through the mother, who is the patient in the 
physician-patient relationship. No such nexus exists here; if tort law will 
compensate the children harmed by negligent genetic engineering, it will 
do so by finding a duty owed to them directly, which can be breached other 
than by means of a breach of duty to their mothers. 
B. Policy Rationale Supporting a Doctor-Patient Duty to 
Embryos Treated with CRISPR/Cas9 
Finding a duty to edited embryos is consistent with the 
development of tort duties to unborn children, as well as with tort law’s 
aim of compensation for injuries. Over the last century, courts have 
recognized that children deserve compensation for injuries, resulting from 
the wrongful acts of others, that were suffered before their birth.95 Some 
jurisdictions have extended this principle to wrongful acts that occurred 
before the conception of the child, so long as a duty to the child’s mother 
was breached and injury to future children was foreseeable from the nature 
of the breach. Therefore, a child who is injured by a wrongful act 
committed after implantation can recover, as can (in some jurisdictions) a 
child whose gamete-precursor was still a part of its mother when a certain 
type of wrongful act, usually reproductive-medical malpractice, was 
committed. But a child injured as an in vitro embryo is barred from 
recovery at the outset under a strict no-duty rule. 
 Even in jurisdictions that do not recognize pre-conception torts, 
drawing the line of liability at implantation rather than conception is 
arbitrary and outdated. There is no reason to restrict compensation for 
injuries caused to an embryo, which was in existence at the time of a 
negligent act, based on whether the act occurred before or after the embryo 
was implanted. There is an identifiable human organism in both scenarios 
to whom harm is foreseeable in the event of medical negligence. And such 
a duty is appropriate as applied to edited embryos intended for 
implantation. Nothing about the ex utero location of these embryos makes 
their injuries less properly compensable (perhaps assuming the embryos 
develop into children who are born alive, depending on jurisdiction) than 
those of embryos injured in utero. 
 Finding a duty to edited embryos also serves tort law’s aim of 
deterring wrongful acts.96 Such deterrence is especially necessary in the 
brave new world of therapeutic germline editing, where one negligent edit 
                                                     
95 Browne, supra note 70, at 2560. 
96 See Edward A. Marshall, Note, Medical Malpractice in the New Eugenics: 
Relying on Innovative Tort Doctrine To Provide Relief When Gene Therapy Fails, 
35 GA. L. REV. 1277, 1323–26 (2001) (discussing the level of deterrence 
necessary to ensure that germ line gene editing is performed with reasonable care).  
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could lead to generations of inherited disease.97 To deny that fertility 
doctors have any duty of care, when performing a procedure that could 
introduce entirely new modifications with unforeseeable effects to the 
gene pool, boggles the mind. Imposing tort liability on fertility doctors 
who practice gene editing would effectually deter, in the gene-editing 
context, the reckless experimentation that has been made possible by the 
veritable Wild West98 of unregulated fertility-clinic practice. (Imagine the 
fertility doctor responsible for the “Octomom” creating designer babies in 
a petri dish.) 
 One possible alternative theory of duty for achieving these aims 
bears addressing: if an ex utero embryo is the property of the parents, 
injuries due to negligent gene editing could be compensable as the result 
of a breach of duty to the parents not to negligently damage their 
property.99 This framing avoids the thorny issue of attaching tort duties, 
which we normally reserve for interactions between persons, directly to 
human embryos in their capacity as human individuals at an early stage of 
development.  
 Despite this benefit, the property framing is an inappropriate 
response to the problem raised. A claim for injuries sustained due to 
negligent gene editing is properly the child’s, rather than the parents’. The 
damages sought are not compensation for the breakage of the parents’ 
pristine embryo; they are intended to compensate a child who lives with a 
severe genetic disease or any number of unpredictable maladies due to 
gene editing gone awry. The duty should be owed to the person for whose 
benefit the law operates. 
 The cases in which property law has been applied to human 
embryos are inapposite, as they have generally involved ownership (or 
custody) contests between parents, not injuries to children.100 In these 
cases, whether the embryos would be implanted at all was subject to 
adjudication, and thus potential injury to the resulting children was far 
afield of the issues discussed. In contrast, therapeutic gene editing would 
always be intended to prepare embryos for implantation, so this context 
suggests recognizing a duty flowing directly to the tiny human the law is 
                                                     
97 Lanphier et al., supra note 66, at 410.  
98 Clements, supra note 11, at 347–48.  
99 See generally Jessica Berg, Owning Persons: The Application of Property 
Theory to Embryos and Fetuses, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 159 (2005) (discussing 
the role of property law in governing categorization of embryos and fetuses). 
100 See id. at 160–61 (listing cases in which property concepts have been applied 
to embryos). 
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trying to protect rather than shoehorning embryos into property categories 
merely to evade an unjust result. 
Another alleged benefit of the property framing is its avoidance of 
conflict with abortion law.101 If embryos are owed duties that resemble 
those owed to persons, the rationale for preferring a mother’s right to an 
abortion over embryos’ and fetuses’ rights is supposedly weakened; if 
embryos are property, no conflict emerges. But the expansion of duty 
proposed herein would not affect abortion rights, since medical providers 
already have a duty not to wrongfully harm the implanted unborn children 
of their patients. Recognizing a duty not to wrongfully harm the conceived, 
but not yet implanted, unborn child of a patient would not affect lawfully 
performed abortions at all—all abortions are performed on the mothers of 
already-implanted unborn children, and abortions that comply with 
applicable law are, by definition, not considered wrongful acts by law. 
 Once a duty is recognized, other aspects of tort liability will need 
to be adapted to the gene-editing context. The need to prove the other 
requirements of relevant tort law—noncompliance with a standard of care, 
causation, and damages—will present unique challenges in the germline 
editing context. Clinical germline editing practice could organically 
develop a standard of care, as happens with other new medical treatments, 
if none is set by legislators or regulatory agencies.102 The effect of any 
single genetic modification on a person’s eventual traits is often 
indeterminate and highly influenced by environmental factors, so in many 
cases causation will be difficult to prove.103 The proximate cause 
requirement may also exclude possible multigenerational injuries resulting 
from harmful germline mutations.104 It is beyond the scope of this Issue 
Brief to detail the solutions to these problems, but lines will need to be 
drawn, as they have been in prior adaptations of tort law to new 
technological possibilities. 
CONCLUSION 
 CRISPR/Cas9 presents much therapeutic promise, but its use must 
be regulated to prevent the sorts of experimental dangers that have plagued 
the fertility industry. If federal and state legislatures are unwilling to step 
in, tort duties will have to adapt—but only slightly—to cover the children 
of CRISPR. Performing molecular surgery on a single-celled human 
                                                     
101 See Wendy C. Shapero, Does a Nonviable Fetus’s Right to Bring a Wrongful 
Death Action Endanger a Woman’s Right to Choose?, 27 Sw. U. L. Rev. 325, 337 
(2003) (arguing that attribution of personhood to unborn children undermines 
abortion rights). 
102 Marshall, supra note 96, at 1295–96, 1304. 
103 Id. at 1297, 1310. 
104 Id. at 1298, 1326. 
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being, so that it will develop into a healthy baby, is a different type of 
medical intervention than malpractice law was created to address, but the 
timeless tort principles of compensating victims and deterring bad acts 
require that, if legislatures do not act to protect these children, courts do. 
